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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RIGHT To IMPARTIAL JURY-PRETRIAL PUB-
LICITY-CHANGE OF VENuE-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
held that a change of venue request based on pretrial publicity can
only be granted where the publicity is prejudicial, pervasive, and in
the minds of the jurors at the time of trial.
Commonwealth v Gorby, 527 Pa 98, 588 A2d 902 (1991).
On December 20, 1985, Jeffrey Gorby (hereinafter "appellant")
and Drayton Sphar were patrons at the Old Trails Inn.1 Sphar,
while buying drinks for the appellant and others, repeatedly dis-
played a large roll of bills which was readily visible to the appel-
lant.2 The victim, Sphar, was wearing a leather jacket, a chain belt
with a buckle containing his name, and was carrying a wallet with
a Harley Davidson emblem embossed on it.3 Sometime between
midnight and 12:30 a.m. on December 21, the appellant and Sphar
left the Old Trails Inn in the victim's car and headed for the Som-
erset Inn.4 Upon leaving, Sphar assured another patron that he
would return quickly.' At approximately 1:00 a.m. the appellant
arrived alone at the Somerset Inn and, displaying a large roll of
bills, bought drinks for everyone present.' The appellant then
showed to several patrons a belt matching the description of the
one worn by the victim earlier in the evening, and he also gave to
the bartender a Harley Davidson wallet.7 The bartender noticed
1. Commonwealth v Gorby, 527 Pa 98, 588 A2d 902, 905 (1991). Although nothing
else in the record indicates that the appellant and the victim were acquainted prior to their
coincidental meeting at the Old Trails Inn on December 20, 1985, the court did have before
it a newspaper article which suggested that the two were in fact acquainted prior to Decem-
ber 20th. The Washington Observer-Reporter, Dec 24, 1985 at 1, col 2. See note 39 for the
full text of the article.
2. Gorby, 588 A2d at 904. The appellant was seated next to Sphar. Id at 905.
3. Id.
4. Id. The appellant and Sphar left the Old Trails Inn after the appellant asked
Sphar for a ride so that the appellant could retrieve his car which was supposedly parked at
the Somerset Inn. Sphar's vehicle was later found in the parking lot of the Somerset Inn. Id.
His body was discovered inside. Id.
5. Id. The patron, James Yeager, was Sphar's roommate and had originally re-
quested Sphar's presence at the Old Trails Inn so that Sphar could drive Yeager home. Id at
904, 905.
6. Id. At trial, the appellant's girlfriend, Susan Loveland, testified that the appellant
had called her on December 20, 1985, requesting money, and that she had given him twenty
dollars. Id.
7. Id.
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blood stains on a knife in the appellant's possession,8 and also no-
ticed the victim's car in the parking lot as he left the Somerset Inn
to drive the appellant to the Old Trails Inn.9 The appellant en-
tered the Old Trails Inn between 2:30 and 3:00 a.m. and again pur-
chased drinks for all present.10 The appellant was wearing a chain
belt wrapped around his hand11 and a patron noticed blood stains
on his pants.12 The appellant was seen leaving the Old Trails Inn
about 4:00 a.m. on December 21, 1985.13 On December 22, police
questioned the appellant, and on December 23 they attempted to
serve him with an arrest warrant but were unable to locate him.
14
The appellant was finally located in April of 1986 in Houston,
Texas,"5 living under an assumed name.'
6
At trial, the appellant's girlfriend, Susan Loveland, testified 17
that the appellant had confessed to her that he had killed Sphar
by stabbing him and slitting his throat,18 and also that he had
robbed Sphar. 19 Loveland further testified that the appellant's con-
8. Id. The bartender, Harold Cain, testified that he noticed the blood stains as the
appellant shaved Cain's arm in an attempt to show him how sharp the knife was. Id.
9. Id. The appellant requested that Cain drive him to the Old Trails Inn. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. The belt was later identified as belonging to the victim. Id.
12. Id. The patron, Nanette Leeper, testified that Gorby explained the blood stains
by saying that he had been gutting deer earlier in the day. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. When the police arrived to serve the appellant, his mother, with whom he had
been living, informed the officers that she had not seen the appellant since shortly after the
police had questioned him on December 22. Id at 906.
15. Id. The Commonwealth, in closing argument, referred to this flight by saying, "I
think [the flight], to a large degree, speaks to itself as to the defendant's participation [in
the crime]." The appellant appealed the trial court's admission of this reference and the
court, citing Commonwealth v Smith, 518 Pa 15, 540 A2d 246 (1988), as the standard for a
new trial based on a prosecutor's comments to the jury, rejected the appeal. Gorby, 588 A2d
at 909.
16. Gorby, 588 A2d at 909. The appellant waived extradition and was returned to
Pennsylvania on April 24, 1986. Id at 906.
17. Id at 907. This testimony served as the basis of the appellant's appeal that the
testimony should have been precluded by the marital incompetency rule because Loveland
was in fact his common law wife. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann §5913 provides in part that, "in a
criminal proceeding husband and wife shall not be competent or permitted to testify against
each other .. " 42 Pa Con Stat Ann § 5913 (1978). Common law marriages have been held
to fall within the meaning of Section 5913. Commonwealth v Smith, 511 Pa 343, 513 A2d
1371 (1986). However, the court found that the appellant was legally married to another
woman during the alleged common law marriage and that therefore no marriage to Loveland
existed. Gorby, 588 A2d at 907. On this basis, the court rejected the appeal and allowed
Loveland's testimony. Id.
18. Gorby, 588 A2d at 905. The victim had in fact been stabbed thirteen times and
his throat was slit. Id at 908.
19. Id.
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fession had taken place at the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge, that
the appellant had a leather jacket and belt with him, both of which
matched the description of those belonging to Sphar, and that the
appellant had disposed of these items in a trash can on the
premises.20
Within a week of Sphar's murder, an article was published re-
garding the murder.2 1 One month before the appellant was appre-
hended, an article profiling the area's ten "most wanted" men
(among them the appellant) was published.22 Two more articles
were published when the appellant was apprehended in Houston
and an article appeared shortly before the appellant's trial
commenced. 3
The appellant was convicted of first degree murder24 and rob-
bery.2 5 At the penalty hearing26 the jury fixed the sentence at
death.2 7 The trial court then heard the appellant's post trial mo-
tions and imposed the sentence as decided by the jury.28 In addi-
tion, the trial court sentenced the appellant to a consecutive term
of eight to sixteen years of imprisonment on the robbery convic-
tion. On automatic direct appeal, 0 the superior court consoli-
20. Id. On December 23, the jacket and the belt and buckle containing the name of
the victim were found in a trash can at the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge. Id. The jacket
had slash marks corresponding to the stab wounds on the body of the victim. Id at 905, 908.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. These articles served as the basis of the appellant's motion for a change of
venue. Id. The trial judge denied the motion and another appeal was taken, appellant again
alleging that the articles were prejudicial. Id at 906. These articles were discussed and four
were reprinted in full. See notes 39, 42, 44 and accompanying text.
24. Gorby, 588 A2d at 906. First degree murder is the intentional and unlawful killing
of a human being. 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2502 (1978).
25. Gorby, 588 A2d at 906. Robbery is the felonious and forcible taking of goods or
money of any value from the person of another by violence or putting in fear. 18 Pa Cons
Stat Ann § 3701 (1976).
26. Gorby, 588 A2d 904 (1991). The penalty hearing denotes the post-conviction stage
at which the jury determines the defendant's punishment. Id.
27. Id at 906. At the post-conviction penalty hearing the jury found two aggravating
circumstances and no mitigating circumstances, the robbery of Sphar and the appellant's
prior felony record being the former. Id at 910. Pennsylvania law requires the imposition of
the death penalty where a jury finds, subsequent to a first degree murder conviction, at least
one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann §
9711(c)(1)(iv) (1980).
28. Gorby, 588 A2d at 904.
29. Id.
30. Id. Pennsylvania law requires that the state supreme court review all cases in
which the death penalty has been imposed to determine the sufficiency of the evidence upon
which the defendant has been convicted. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 722(4) (1988); 42 Pa Cons
Stat Ann § 9711(h)(1) (1988); PaRAP Rule 702(b). In reviewing such evidence, the court
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dated and transferred"' the appellant's appeal of the trial judge's
denial of his request for a change of venue based on pretrial
publicity.2
The issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether
the trial judge's denial of the appellant's request for a change of
venue was proper.33 In his motion for a change of venue, the appel-
lant argued that the newspaper articles concerning his case were so
emotional and inflammatory, and that the publicity surrounding
the case was so extensive, that his right to a fair trial without a
change of venue was effectively precluded.34 The court began its
analysis by finding that only when a trial judge has abused his dis-
must determine whether the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, is sufficient to
establish all the elements of the offense(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v
Rhodes, 510 Pa 537, 510 A2d 1217 (1986); Gorby, 588 A2d at 904. Further, the court must
determine whether the sentence imposed is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty im-
posed in similar cases. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9711(h)(3)(iii) (1988). Pursuant to this statu-
tory duty, the court reviewed the appellant's trial and affirmed the judgment and sentence.
Gorby, 588 A2d at 911.
31. Gorby, 588 A2d at 911. Gorby's appeal of the denial of the change of venue mo-
tion was consolidated and transferred by the superior court to the supreme court because
the case was already required to go to the supreme court on direct appeal. See note 30;
FRAP 3(6).
32. Gorby, 588 A2d at 911. The automatic direct appeal also contained a consolida-
tion of various other appeals which the state supreme court addressed. Id. Besides the
points of appeal discussed in notes 15 and 17, the appellant appealed the fact that the
evidence used to convict him was purely circumstantial. Id. Citing Commonwealth v Hal-
comb, 508 Pa 425, 498 A2d 833 (1985), the court concluded that, "The law is well settled
that circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to convict one of a crime." Gorby, 588 A2d at
908. The appellant also appealed the trial court's refusal to sequester the jury because of the
case's allegedly extensive publicity. Id. The court, rejecting this appeal, held that Common-
wealth v Jackson, 481 Pa 426, 392 A2d 1366 (1978), requires a showing of actual prejudice
rather than a mere assertion that such prejudice will occur. Gorby, 588 A2d at 908. Appel-
lant next assigned as error the admission of photographs depicting the crime scene. Id. The
court, in rejecting this appeal, found that the photographs "provided essential evidence
tending to show that the defendant intended to inflict more than serious bodily injury" and
were therefore necessary to a first degree murder prosecution. Id. Finally, the appellant ap-
pealed the jury's finding that his prior criminal record was an aggravating circumstance, see
note 27, on the ground that he had intended to plead guilty to misdemeanors, and not to the
felonies which the jury found to constitute an aggravating circumstance. Gorby, 588 A2d at
908. The court, finding that the appellant in fact intended the felony plea, also held that the
jury's finding of another aggravating circumstance, namely, the robbery of Sphar, was alone
sufficient to support the death penalty sentence even in the absence of the prior criminal
record. Id at 911.
33. Gorby, 588 A2d at 911. PaRCrP § 312(a) provides in part that "venue ... may
be changed ... when it is determined after hearing that a fair and impartial trial cannot
otherwise be had in the county where the case is currently pending." 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann §
312(a) (1981).
34. Gorby, 588 A2d at 906.
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cretion in denying a change of venue request will his decision be
overturned on appeal.35 Further, the court held that pre-trial pub-
licity will be deemed inherently prejudicial where the publicity is
inflammatory, sensational and biased against the accused rather
than objective; reveals any prior record of the accused; refers to
confessions or admissions by the accused; or is derived solely from
those asserting the defendant's guilt, namely, police or prosecu-
tors. 6 However, the court continued, even the existence of one of
these elements will not require a change of venue if sufficient time
has lapsed between the publication and trial for the prejudice to
dissipate.3 7
The court next reviewed the articles which the appellant con-
tended contained emotional and inflammatory accounts of the
crime. 8 The first of these,"e the court found, was published within
a week of the crime, contained only factual accounts, and omitted
any reference to the appellant's criminal record or confessions.40
Another article, which was published prior to the appellant's ap-
prehension, profiled the area's ten "most wanted" men, but only
mentioned the appellant's name and appearance, and briefly dis-
cussed the facts. 41 The court further found that two more articles
4 2
35. Id. The court cited Commonwealth v Buehl, 510 Pa 363, 508 A2d 1167 (1986), as
the appropriate standard for an appellate court to employ in reviewing a trial court's deci-
sion regarding a change of venue request. Gorby, 588 A2d at 906.
36. Gorby, 588 A2d at 906. The court cited Commonwealth v Pursell, 508 Pa 212, 495
A2d 183 (1985), as setting forth the aforementioned standards beyond which publicity will
be deemed prejudicial. Gorby, 588 A2d at 906.
37. Gorby, 588 A2d at 906. The court cited Commonwealth v Casper, 481 Pa 143, 392
A2d 287 (1978), as establishing this proposition. Gorby, 588 A2d at 906.
38. Gorby, 588 A2d at 907.
39. Id. The article read as follows:
State police have issued a warrant for the arrest of Thomas Gorby of Eighty Four,
Washington County, in the fatal stabbing of Drayton Sphar, 39, of Washington, Pa.
Gorby is wanted on charges of criminal homicide and robbery.
Sphar's body was found in his car in a parking lot at the Somerset Inn in Somerset
Township Saturday night.
Coroner Farrell Jackson said Sphar, owner of an auto repair shop in Washington,
had been stabbed several times in the chest and throat. Troopers said their ivestiga-
tion (sic) showed Gorby and the victim were acquainted and the suspect was the last
person to see the victim alive.
Police said Sphar was known to carry as much as $500. When his body was discov-
ered, he bad $1.40.
Gorby was described as 6-foot-i, 160 pounds with shoulder length brown hair, a
dark beard and mustache.
The Washington Observer-Reporter, Dec 24, 1985 at 1, col 2.
40. Gorby, 588 A2d at 907.
41. Id.
42. Id. The articles read as follows:
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published when the appellant was apprehended, which only men-
tioned minimal facts regarding the murder of Sphar, presented no
threat to a fair trial.4 Finally, the court discussed an article44 pub-
lished shortly before the appellant's trial was commenced, and
found that it only mentioned the fact that the appellant was ar-
rested in Houston, Texas and was awaiting trial for the murder of
Sphar.45
The court then reviewed the voir dire proceeding46 to determine
whether any of the jurors were in fact prejudiced by pretrial pub-
licity,47 and held that none of the jurors in the appellant's trial
1) A Washington County man wanted in a fatal stabbing at a tavern near Eighty-
Four has been arrested in Houston, Texas.
Thomas J. Gorby, 27, of Eighty-Four was taken in custody without incident. He is
accused of killing Drayton Sphar, 39, of Washington in the parking lot of the Somer-
set Inn Dec. 21.
Gorby was returned to Washington and jailed without bond on a charge of criminal
homicide.
The Pittsburgh Press, Apr 26, 1986 at C2, col 4.
2) A Washington County coroner's jury Thursday recommended Thomas Gorby, 27,
of Eighty-Four, be held for further court action in the stabbing death of Drayton
Sphar, 39.
Sphar's body was found in his car in the parking lot of the Somerset Inn on Dec.
21.
Assistant Director Attorney Dan Johnson said key points in the case were testi-
mony by a bartender who said he saw Sphar and Gorby together on Dec. 21 and a
motorcycle jacket in Gorby's possession that had slash marks similar to those on
Sphar's body.
Gorby, who had been a fugitive for four months and was extradited to Pennsylva-
nia from Houston, Texas, last week, was charged with criminal homicide.
The Washington Observer-Reporter, May 1, 1986 at 1, col 2.
43. Gorby, 588 A2d at 907.
44. Id. The article read as follows:
A Washington County man has been held for trial on criminal homicide and rob-
bery charges in the fatal stabbing of Drayton Sphar, 39, of Washington, Pa.
Thomas J. Gorby, 27, of Eighty-Four, was held following a preliminary hearing
before District Justice Paul Pozonsky of McDonald.
Sphar was found stabbed to death Dec. 21 inside his parked car outside the Somer-
set Inn near Eighty-Four.
Gorby fled after the stabbing but was arrested in Houston, Texas. He was held
without bond pending trial.
The Washington Observer-Reporter, May 16, 1986 at 2, col 2.
45. Gorby, 588 A2d at 907.
46. Id. Voir dire "denotes the preliminary examination which the court and attorneys
make of prospective jurors to determine their qualifications and suitability to serve as ju-
rors." Black's Law Dictionary 1575 (West, 6th ed 1990).
47. Gorby, 588 A2d at 907. The court cited Commonwealth v Bachert, 499 Pa 398,
453 A2d 931 (1982), as mandating that the court focus on whether any juror formed a fixed
opinion of the defendant's guilt or innocence as a result of the pre-trial publicity. Gorby, 588
A2d at 906.
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were so prejudiced.48
In light of the foregoing determinations, namely that the articles
were neither prejudicial nor the cause of any juror bias, the court
concluded that there was no abuse of discretion at the trial court
level49 in the denial of the appellant's request for a change of
venue.
50
Establishing the proper balance between the right to a free press
and an accused's right to an impartial trial "has long been a com-
plex and troublesome problem.' 51 This balance becomes even more
difficult to achieve because both of the rights involved are indeed
"fundamental. ' 52 Freedom of the press 53 has long been recognized
as the "handmaiden '54 of justice because it subjects the judicial
process to the full light of public scrutiny.5  The importance of this
truism can hardly be overstated and, in the pursuit to expose the
judicial system, the press has generally been afforded "the
broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly society.1
56
However, the courts have generally held that the press, in fulfil-
ling its critical duty, cannot be permitted to interfere with the
right to a fair trial.57 These holdings have been firmly grounded in
48. Gorby, 588 A2d at 907. The court found that of the seventy potential jurors,
thirty-four said they knew something about the case, twenty-six said they had no knowledge
of the incident, and ten were not asked because they were excused for personal reasons. Id.
Only four of the thirty-four who had some knowledge of the case said they may have been
influenced by the publicity, but none of those four were ultimately chosen as members of
the jury. Id.
49. Id. The court stated:
Our review yields no evidence of either actual prejudice or any pre-trial publicity that
was so sensational or inflammatory as to justify a presumption of prejudice. Accord-
ingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to grant a change of
venue.
Id.
50. Id. The court affirmed the conviction and sentence of the appellant on April 3,
1991. Id at 902.
51. Commonwealth v Pierce, 451 Pa 190, 303 A2d 209 (1973).
52. James T. Ranney, Remedies for Prejudicial Publicity: A Brief Review, 211 Vill L
Rev 819, 820 (1976), citing Commonwealth v Bruno, 466 Pa 245, 352 A2d 40 (1976).
53. See US Const, Amend I.
54. Pierce, 303 A2d at 211.
55. In Sheppard v Maxwell, 384 US 333 (1966), the United States Supreme Court,
per Justice Clark, recognized the vital role of the press in fostering justice by stating, "The
principle that justice cannot survive behind walls of silence has long been reflected in the
'Anglo-American distrust for secret trials.'" In re Oliver, 333 US 257, 268 (1948), quoting
Sheppard, 384 US at 349-50.
56. Bridges v California, 314 US 252, 265 (1941).
57. Interference with this right has been consistently held to constitute a violation of
due process. In Irwin v Dowd, 366 US 717 (1961), Justice Clark stated, "The right to a jury
trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent
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the belief that, "The theory of our system is that the conclusions
to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argu-
ment in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of
private talk or public print."58
Clearly, the place in which pretrial publicity has had its most
damaging impact is in the minds of jurors. 59 This is so because ju-
rors, like all people, are "extremely likely to be impregnated by the
environing atmosphere ' ' 0 and can therefore be biased against the
accused simply by what they read or hear prior to trial. This bias is
impermissible because "a juror who has formed an opinion cannot
be impartial"61 and impartiality is required by law.62
It follows, then, that courts have historically focused on the
standards with which to gauge pretrial publicity in a given case to
determine if it jeopardizes the accused's right to a fair trial. A re-
view of the relevant Pennsylvania case law reveals that, even
though "each case [turns] on its [own] special facts,' 63 a relatively
consistent standard has emerged.
The modern Pennsylvania law regarding pretrial publicity began
to emerge in Commonwealth v Pierce.4 In Pierce, the court found
that the publicity surrounding the murders of a seminarian and a
lawyer was "emotionally charged and inflammatory, ' 65 referred to
re-enactments and admissions of the crime, mentioned the ac-
cused's prior criminal record, and was taken predominantly from
the statements of police and prosecutors.6 In holding that the
jurors. The failure to afford an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of
due process." Irwin, 366 US at 721. Similarly, the Supreme Court has concluded that, "A
fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." In re Murchison, 349 US
133, 136 (1955). Further, the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and due process of law
are applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. US Const, Amend VI and
XIV; Pa Const, Art I, § 9.
58. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, in Patterson v Colorado, 205 US 454, 462
(1907).
59. Obviously, a vast number of convictions have been reversed because pretrial pub-
licity was deemed, on review, to have precluded the defendant's right to a fair trial. Com-
monwealth v Pierce, 451 Pa 190, 303 A2d 209 (1973); Commonwealth v Frazier, 471 Pa 121,
369 A2d 1224 (1977); Commonwealth v Cohen, 489 Pa 167, 413 A2d 1066 (1980).
60. Frank v Magnum, 237 US 309, 345, 349 (1915).
61. 1 Burr's Trial 416 (1807).
62. See note 57.
63. Marshall v United States, 360 US 310, 312 (1959).
64. 451 Pa 190, 303 A2d 209 (1972).
65. Pierce, 303 A2d at 211.
66. Id. The court also found gross abuses of discretion by the police and prosecutors.
Id. For example, it was the authorities who referred to the defendant as the confessed "trig-
german" with a prior criminal record. Id. Also, it was the police who staged a highly public
re-enactment. Id. Further, the court found that the district attorney's office released state-
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publicity was therefore "inherently prejudicial" in pointing to the
defendant's guilt,67 the court adopted the view of the United
States Supreme Court that such a finding relieves the accused of
the usual duty to show actual prejudice.6 8 In so finding, the court
reversed the defendant's conviction on the grounds that a change
of venue request was improperly denied. 9
Commonwealth v Frazier,70 citing Pierce with approval, clearly
sets forth the appropriate standard of review for high publicity
cases. 71 Here, an eleven-year-old girl was murdered in a small rural
community in which only one other murder had occurred that
year.72 The community's reaction was intense and the local news-
paper gave the story extensive headline coverage.7 3 The coverage
detailed the defendant's prior criminal record, quoted a family
member referring to the defendant as "mentally ill," recited ad-
missions made by the accused,74 and relied heavily on information
from the police.
75
However, the court's analysis did not stop with these findings. It
proceeded, citing Pierce, to look at the pervasiveness of the public-
ity.76 This second step is required, the court ruled, because some
ments, one promising "a swift and very special treatment" to the perpetrator, which un-
doubtedly aroused the emotions of the community. Id. In response to such abuses the court
ruled, referring to the ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards
Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, §§ 1.1 and 2.1 (Approved Draft 1968), that police and
prosecutors shall not release to the news media any statement or confession given by the
accused, prior criminal records of the accused, inflammatory statements referring to the'case
or the accused, the possibility of a guilty plea, or photographs of the accused connecting him
with the crime scene. Pierce, 303 A2d at 211. The court concluded that "anything short of
compliance with these standards can operate to deprive an accused of due process of law."
Id at 214.
67. Pierce, 303 A2d at 212.
68. Id. The court cited Sheppard v Maxwell, 384 US 333 (1966); Turner v Louisiana,
379 US 466 (1965); and Rideau v Louisiana, 373 US 723 (1963), as authority for the proposi-
tion that some publicity is so "inherently lacking in due process" that the accused need not
show actual prejudice. Pierce, 303 A2d at 212.
69. Pierce, 303 A2d at 211.
70. 471 Pa 121, 369 A2d 1224 (1977).
71. Frazier, 369 A2d at 1227.
72. Id.
73. Id. For example, the newspaper announced the defendant's arrest in red print
headlines measuring over one-half inch in height and included a large picture of the defend-
ant. Id at 1226.
74. Id.
75. Id. One such story, which occupied one-third of the front page, quoted a state
police sergeant as saying that the defendant went Christmas shopping after murdering the
girl. Id.
76. Id at 1227. It is unclear how much emphasis the court in Pierce placed on the
pervasiveness of the news coverage, but it does appear, in light of passing references to
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pretrial publicity can be "so sustained, so pervasive, so inflam-
1177matory and so inculpatory as to demand a change of venue ... .
Finding that the coverage was in fact so pervasive, s the court then
sought to determine whether "a sufficiently long period of time
[had] passed" between the time of the publicity and the applica-
tion for a change of venue for the prejudicial effect of the publicity
to have dissipated.7 The court pursued this third prong8 by ex-
amining the voir dire record,"' and reversed the defendant's con-
viction,8 2 concluding that the four-month period between the pub-
licity and the trial was not sufficiently long.
3
Yet another high publicity murder trial was reviewed by the
court in Commonwealth v Rolison,8 4 where the defendant was con-
victed of the first degree murder of the husband of one of his co-
conspirators. In support of his motion for a change of venue, the
defendant presented evidence that his co-conspirator's trial was
the first murder trial in twenty years in the county of 30,000, that
a widespread belief existed in the county that he was in fact guilty,
and that numerous articles regarding the crime had been published
in newspapers with a combined circulation of 24,000.85 The fact
that the defendant had also been named as the actual killer in his
"widespread publicity," Pierce, 303 A2d at 211, and an extended quote from a case relying
heavily on the pervasiveness of publicity, Rideau v Louisiana, 373 US 723 (1963), that per-
vasiveness was factored into the court's analysis.
77. Frazier, 369 A2d at 1227.
78. Id. The court found that the newspaper carrying the relevant articles was deliv-
ered daily to approximately 30,000 of the 31,074 households in the county. Id.
79. Id at 1228.
80. As previously discussed, see notes 70-77 and accompanying text, the first prong is
the determination of whether the publicity was in fact prejudicial, and the second is
whether the prejudicial publicity was so pervasive as to "create a likelihood that a signifi-
cant percentage of potential jurors had been exposed to it." Id at 1230.
81. Id. The court found that of thirty-two potential jurors asked, twenty-eight recal-
led reading or hearing of the murder, and eleven of the fourteen seated jurors also recalled
reading or hearing of the murder. Id. Two jurors stated that they did not recall if they knew
of the murder prior to voir dire, and one said that he did not know of the murder prior to
voir dire. Id. Also at voir dire, the defendant had eleven challenges for cause because jurors
had formed fixed opinions. Id at 1229.
82. Id. Justice Nix dissented, contending that the United States Supreme Court re-
quires a showing of actual prejudice unless the publicity can be deemed inherently prejudi-
cial, end since the publicity in this case could not be so deemed, the change of venue request
was properly denied.* Justice Nix viewed the majority's approach as a "sub silentio" depar-
ture from precedent. Id at 1230.
83. Id. Nine months had passed between publication and trial in Pierce. Pierce, 303
A2d at 210. However, in Commonwealth v Kirchline, 468 Pa 265, 361 A2d 282 (1976), six
months was held to be sufficient. Frazier, 369 A2d at 1227.
84. 473 Pa 261, 374 A2d 509 (1977).
85. Rolinson, 374 A2d at 511.
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co-conspirator's trial had also been published. 6 The court, review-
ing the types of articles that had been found prejudicial in Fra-
zier, 7 concluded that no such article was published regarding Roli-
son.8 The court continued,89 holding that once a defendant has
proceeded to voir dire, a showing of actual prejudice is required to
support a change of venue request.90 The court then reviewed the
records of voir dire to determine if any prejudice in fact existed
and found none.9 1 Accordingly, it affirmed the denial of the de-
fendant's request for a change of venue.2
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Manderino, with whom Justice
Roberts joined, argued that the majority's view of that which can
be prejudicial is too narrow, and that elements other than those
present in Frazier (namely, references to confessions, a prior crimi-
nal record, and reports which go beyond objective reporting)93 can
constitute prejudicial publicity.9 4 The publicity here, Justice
Manderino concluded, while different from that in Frazier, still
jeopardized the defendant's right to a fair trial and the voir dire
results confirmed the prejudice. 5
The Frazier standard has not been limited to publicity arising
from murder trials. For instance, in Commonwealth v Casper,9" the
chairman of the county Democratic Committee was charged with
numerous counts of "macing. ' '97 The record before the court con-
tained fifty articles, ten of which mentioned the defendant's name
and six of which referenced his name in the first three
86. Id.
87. Id at 512. The court in Frazier was confronted with articles which referred to the
defendant's prior criminal record and confessions, and went beyond objective reporting. Id.
88. Id. The court concluded that the articles were limited to "factual accounts...
and contained no inflammatory material." Id.
89. Under the standards set forth in Pierce and Frazier, the court's analysis in Roli-
son could have terminated with the failure to find prejudicial pretrial publicity.
90. Id.
91. Id. The court found that all fourteen jurors empaneled stated on voir dire that
they had no opinion whatsoever on the appellant's guilt. Id at 513.
92. Id at 515.
93. See note 75 and accompanying text.
94. Rolison, 374 A2d at 516 (Manderino dissenting).
95. Frazier, 369 A2d at 1224. Justice Manderino's review demonstrates that 101 of
111 potential jurors asked replied that they had read or heard of the case, and sixty-one
challenges for cause were granted relating to juror bias. Rolison, 374 A2d at 517.
96. 481 Pa 243, 392 A2d 287 (1978).
97. Casper, 392 A2d at 290. "Macing" occurs when a demand for political contribu-
tions is made on public employees with the understanding that such contributions will en-
sure the stability of the employees' jobs. Id.
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paragraphs.9 The defendant's photograph appeared twice, none of
the articles mentioned testimony before the grand jury which in-
dicted the defendant, and a summary of the grand jury's present-
ments appeared on page fifteen of the newspaper."" No accounts of
admissions, a prior criminal record, or statements from police or
prosecutors were published. 00 The court, reciting the three-part
Frazier standard, found that the publicity was not prejudicial and
therefore did not proceed to (other than by mention) the second
step.' 01 The court did, however, review voir dire to amplify the lack
of prejudicial pretrial publicity. 02 In so finding, the court reversed
the superior court's finding of "inherent prejudice" 10 3 and held
that the trial court's denial of the change of venue request was
proper. 04
Two years later, in another murder trial, the state high court
again reviewed a high publicity murder case. In Commonwealth v
Cohen,0 5 the defendant was convicted of murder and conspir-
acy.10 6 In support of his motion for a change of venue, the defend-
ant presented extensive evidence regarding prejudicial pretrial
publicity. 0 7 The defendant offered into the record various publica-
tions, 08 many of which referred to the trial as one involving a
"contract killing,"' 09 others of which alluded to the defendant's use
of drugs and alcohol. 1 0 The defendant also introduced a public
opinion poll,"' conducted by an expert, on the impact of criminal
98. Id at 294.
99. Id.
100. Id at 295.
101. Id.
102. Id. The court found that only fourteen of the thirty-two prospective jurors ques-
tioned had any knowledge of the case, and none of the thirteen who were ultimately seated
had any fixed opinion as to the defendant's guilt. Id at 296.
103. Id. The court also struck down the superior court's finding that, because the de-
fendant was a "public figure," his right to a fair trial was jeopardized. Id. The court found
first that the defendant was not in fact well known and, secondly, that even if he was well
known a court cannot assume prejudice against him. Id. The court characterized the lower
court's findings as an "unwarranted," id at 290, change in Commonwealth law. Id at 297.
104. Id at 290.
105. 489 Pa 167, 413 A2d 1066 (1980).
106. Cohen, 413 A2d at 1071.
107. Id at 1069.
108. Id. These publications consisted of forty-two articles, sixteen front page stories,
numerous large photographs, and transcripts of thirty-eight radio broadcasts. Id at 1073.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id at 1069. Public opinion polls are expressly recommended as a means to deter-
mine the pervasiveness and prejudicial impact of pretrial publicity. ABA Standards Relating
to a Fair Trial and Free Press, Standard 8-3.3(b) (Approved Draft, 2d ed 1978). Cohen, 413
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proceedings on public opinion" 2 that concluded that a fair trial in
the county was very unlikely. 113 Further, six lay witnesses testified'
that the defendant could not get a fair trial in the county.114 The
court, again using the standard set forth in Frazier,"5 found that
the publicity was prejudicial, clearly widespread, and in the minds
of the jury at the time of trial."6 The court accordingly ordered a
change of venue." 7
Yet another application of the Frazier standard occurred in
Commonwealth v Romeri,l1 8 where the defendant was convicted of
first degree murder. Only one article was published regarding the
crime, but it referred to confessions, the defendant's prior contact
with law enforcement agencies and, the court found, implicit in the
story was the trial court's view that the defendant was guilty.119 On
this basis, the court found the article "inherently prejudicial."' 20
The court then proceeded, citing the Frazier three-part test, to
judge the pervasiveness of the publicity by examining the voir dire
results. 12 ' The court concluded that the publicity had not so satu-
A2d at 1069 n 5.
112. Id at 1070. Dr. Jay Schulman, a professor at Columbia University, has consulted
in over fifty criminal and civil proceedings, including the "Harrisburg 7" case, United
States v Ellsberg, 455 F2d 1270 (1st Cir 1972), United States v Mitchell and Stans, 485
F2d 1290 (2d Cir 1973), the "Wounded Knee" cases, the "Attica" cases, and the Joan Little
case. Id at 1069-70 n 5.
113. Cohen, 413 A2d at 1070. The poll found that 65% of all residents of the county
knew of the case and 30% of the population admitted to adjudging the defendant guilty. Id
at 1076. The poll was conducted during the two months prior to Cohen's first hearing. Id.
114. Id at 1070.
115. Id at 1077.
116. Id. The court looked to voir dire to establish the actual impact of the prejudicial
publicity. Id at 1076. It found that 105 of the 169 prospective jurors asked held an opinion
as to the defendant's guilt, and that eighty-nine of those 105 admitted a fixed opinion of the
defendant's guilt. Id. Those eight-nine (or 53% of the original 169) were dismissed for cause.
Id. Also, twelve of the fourteen seated jurors knew of the case and one admitted a fixed
opinion as to the guilt of Cohen. Id at 1076 n 36. The court called this evidence of juror bias
"unprecedented." Id at 1077.
117. Id. Justice Nix dissented, contending that the five years since the murder at least
required the court to determine the present climate in the county before ordering a change
of venue. Id. With the remaining findings of the majority, Justice Nix was in "substantial
agreement." Id.
118. 504 Pa 124, 470 A2d 498 (1983).
119. Romeri, 470 A2d at 503.
120. Id. The court defined "inherently prejudicial" as "publicity which is harmful to
the accused and which may or may not require a change of venue depending on what effect
it has had in the community from which prospective jurors are drawn." Id at 501 n 1.
121. Id at 503. The court found that only seven of the eighty-eight prospective jurors
(or 8%) had a fixed opinion as to the defendant's guilt, and none of the fourteen seated
jurors had read the article. Id.
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rated the community as to require a change of venue.122 Accord-
ingly, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the change of
venue request.123
Justice Zappala dissented,'24 arguing that once publicity has
been deemed inherently prejudicial, a change of venue is required
because the majority's definition of "inherently prejudicial"' 25 in-
cludes pervasiveness, 12 6 the very element which the majority found
absent. 2 '
The supreme court again reviewed a change of venue request in
Commonwealth v Haag, 28 where the defendant was convicted of
first degree murder.12 9 An article was published which summarized
the charges against the defendant, described the voir dire proceed-
ings, indicated that the crime was related to money and drugs, and
stated that a co-conspirator was convicted for the same crime. 30
Another article added that the defendant had allegedly paid to
have the victim killed.' 3 ' The court held that the articles were not
inherently prejudicial and, after reviewing voir dire,132 concluded
that the publicity was not pervasive133 and therefore that the
change of venue request was properly denied.13 4
Another recent application of the Frazier standard occurred in
Commonwealth v Breakiron,13 5 where the defendant was convicted
of first degree murder. The publicity upon which the defendant
based his request for a change of venue described the crime as
"grisly," contained emotional statements by the prosecutor, 136
showed the defendant handcuffed and in police custody, detailed
122. Id at 503-04.
123. Id at 504.
124. Id at 506 (Zappala dissenting).
125. Id. See note 76 and accompanying text.
126. Romeri, 470 A2d at 506.
127. Id. Justice Nix, believing the article to be inherently prejudicial, again contended
that a finding of inherent prejudice mandates a change of venue. Id. See also Justice Nix
dissent in Frazier, 369 A2d at 1230.
128. 522 Pa 388, 562 A2d 289 (1989).
129. Haag, 562 A2d at 291.
130. Id at 294.
131. Id.
132. Id at 295. The court found that eight of the fourteen jurors knew nothing of the




135. 524 Pa 282, 571 A2d 1035 (1990).
136. Breakiron, 571 A2d at 1036-37. The district attorney described the crime as "the
most brutal I've ever seen." Id.
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his criminal record, contained disparaging quotes from his family
and others,1 37 and contained a story headlined, "Few Willing to
Talk about Troubled Hopwood Man.' 1 38 The court, citing the
Romeri court's characterization of the Frazier standard, 3 9 found
the publicity "unquestionably" prejudicial. 40 However, the court
held that since nearly a year had elapsed between the time of the
publicity and the time of jury selection, and in light of the voir
dire review,' 4 ' the publicity did not jeopardize the defendant's
trial. '4 2 Accordingly, 143 the court affirmed the denial of the defend-
ant's request for a change of venue.1
44
In sum, the historical development of Pennsylvania law regard-
ing prejudicial pretrial publicity has achieved a relatively fixed and
consistently applied standard. The publicity in Gorby probably
does not rise to the level of that found inherently prejudicial in the
foregoing case review. In Pierce, which involved the murders of two
prominent citizens, the publicity mentioned the defendant's prior
criminal record and referred to admissions and re-enactments of
the crime. 45 In Frazier, where only one other murder had occurred
in the county that year, the publicity detailed the defendant's
criminal record, referred to admissions made by the defendant and
cited a disparaging quote from a family member. 46 None of these
factors (in either case), which contributed to the prejudicial nature
of the publicity, were present in the publicity referring to the de-
137. Id. The victim's father described him as a "cuckoo." Id at 1037. An uncle was
quoted as saying, "Please tell them he's not my son." Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. The appropriate standard is set forth as follows:
1. Whether pretrial publicity was inherently prejudicial;
2. Whether pretrial publicity saturated the community;
3. Whether there was a sufficient proximity in time between the publicity and the
selection of a jury such that the community. . . [could] "cool down" from the effects




141. Id at 1038. The court found that none of the jurors had more than "a vague
recollection" of the publicity, at least two of them were "totally unaware" of the publicity,
and none had formed a fixed opinion as to the defendant's guilt. Id.
142. Id.
143. The court expressly declined to address part two of the standard cited in note 76
because, "even if saturation of the community were established, the cooling-off period was
sufficient to allow an impartial jury to be empaneled." Id at 1038 n 2.
144. Id at 1038. Justices Nix and Zappala dissented on unrelated grounds. Id at 1044.
145. See notes 64-69 and accompanying text.




Even though the publicity in all three cases refers to information
provided by the authorities, the publicity concerning Gorby148 is
not nearly as reliant on such sources as that found in Pierce and
Frazier.
Moreover, in Cohen, where publicity was also found to be preju-
dicial, the court reviewed forty-one articles and thirty-eight radio
broadcasts, many of which referred to the defendant as a "contract
killer" and alluded to his abuse of drugs and alcohol. 49 Also, ex-
pert and lay witnesses testified regarding the defendant's inability
to receive a fair trial in the venue county. 50 No such extensive evi-
dence of prejudice was in the record, or even alleged, regarding the
defendant Gorby.
Likewise, even if the publicity in Gorby was found to be inher-
ently prejudicial, it was not nearly as pervasive as that found in
Frazier and Cohen.15' In the former, the newspaper carrying the
prejudicial articles was delivered to approximately 30,000 of the
31,074 households in the county. 52 Also, eleven of the fourteen
seated jurors had heard or read of the murder prior to trial.153 In
Cohen, a public opinion poll showed that 65% of the residents of
the venue county had heard of the case and 30% had adjudged the
defendant guilty prior to trial.15 4 Further, eighty-nine of the origi-
nal 169 potential jurors (or 53%) were dismissed for cause, twelve
of the fourteen seated jurors knew of the case prior to trial, and
one admitted a fixed opinion as to the guilt of Cohen. 5 5 By con-
trast, none of Gorby's jurors admitted that they had been per-
suaded by pretrial publicity and the paper in which the articles
were published had a circulation of 39,000 in a county of 217,000
147. See notes 39, 42, 44 and accompanying text.
148. The articles quoted in notes 39 and 42 contain the only information provided by
the authorities that was in the Gorby record. Those quotations probably do not constitute
"inflammatory statements referring to the accused or the case," which were expressly pro-
hibited by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Pierce, 303 A2d at 214. See note 66.
149. See notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
150. See notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
151. 413 A2d 1066. Although it is unclear, it is probable that the court in Pierce, found
the publicity to be sufficiently pervasive to mandate a change of venue. See note 76 and
accompanying text.
152. See note 78 and accompanying text.
153. See note 81 and accompanying text.
154. See note 113 and accompanying text.
155. See note 116 and accompanying text.
156. See note 48 and accompanying text.
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residents, 157 a far cry from the nearly total exposure of county resi-
dents to the prejudicial publicity in Frazier. In this light, the pub-
licity regarding Gorby cannot be said to have been so pervasive
that it prejudiced Gorby's right to a fair trial.
Finally, assuming the publicity was inherently prejudicial and
pervasive, the analysis would focus on the voir dire results to es-
tablish whether sufficient time had elapsed between the publica-
tion of the prejudicial articles and trial for the prejudicial effect of
the publicity to dissipate.158 While the two months which passed
between the publicity and trial in Gorby might seem insufficient to
have allowed the prejudicial effect to subside, the fact that none of
Gorby's jurors were found to be prejudiced indicates otherwise.159
In sum, the publicity referring to Gorby was not prejudicial, per-
vasive, or in the minds of the jurors at trial, and did not therefore
threaten the defendant's right to a fair trial. These conclusions, as
determined by the state supreme court and the foregoing review,
are completely consistent with and mandated by the case law of
Pennsylvania.
John Jacob Hare
157. See Audit Bureau of Circulations (Mar 1992) and The Pennsylvania Manual, vol
109 at 561 (Dept. of General Services, Dec 1989).
158. A review of the cases emphasizes the fact that there is no specific time period
after which the court will find the publicity has dissipated. For instance, four- and nine-
month periods were held not to be sufficiently long for the prejudicial effect of publicity to
subside in Frazier and Pierce, respectively. Yet, in Kirchline, six months was held to be
sufficiently long, and in Breakiron the court found that highly prejudicial and pervasive
publicity dissipated after one year.
159. Of course, the fact that none of the jurors were prejudiced also reflects the lack of
pervasiveness, but the assumption upon which the analysis of the third step rests is that the
publicity was both prejudicial and pervasive. Without such an assumption the analysis
would never proceed to the third step. Similarly, the analysis of whether the publicity was
pervasive (the second step) would not occur without the assumption that the publicity was
in fact prejudicial.
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